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WHAT IS BEHIND IT, AND WHERE IS IT HEADED?
ABSTRACT
This paper documents recent external sector liberalization in developing
countries, evaluates what is behind it, and assesses whether it is likely to
persist, accelerate or reverse itself. It draws heavily upon material
collected during a recent Ford Foundation-supported research project on
developing countries and the global trading system (see Whalley (1989))
covering eleven developing countries (Argentina, Brazil, China, Costa Rica,
India, Kenya, Mexico, Nigeria, The Philippines, Republic of Korea and
Tanzania). Many factors underlie these liberalizations. These include
rethinking of the basic approach towards trade policy in a number of countries,
with less commitment than earlier to import substitution and more interest in
outward-oriented development strategies. Conditionality in World Bank and IMF
lending programs appears important in Africa, and in some of the Asian and
Latin American countries. In some cases, sector-specific liberalization has
also been the result of bilateral pressure from the U.S. and the European
Community. Recent strong macro performance in the developed world has also
generated substantial growth in foreign exchange earnings for developing
countries, and facilitated this liberslization. The paper concludes by
suggesting that, in the short to medium term, some reciprocal actions by the
developed countries in the GATT Uruguay Round would help in keeping domestic
political support for these liberalizations alive.
John Whalley
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2I INTRODUCTION
This paper tries to document the extent and coverage of
recent external sector liberalization in developing countries,
evaluate what is behind it, and assess whether it is likely to
persist, accelerate or reverse itself. As such, it draws heavily
upon material collected during a recent Ford Foundation-supported
research project on developing countries and the global trading
system (see t'Jhalley (1989)) covering eleven developing countries
(Argentina, Brazil, China, Costa Rica, India, Kenya, Mexico,
Nigeria, The Philippines, Republic of Korea, and Tanzania).
What seems to make this liberalization worthy of study Is
that much of it appears to have gone relatively unnoticed, while
at the same time seemingly representing major change. It covers
a large number of countrIes, and in them, a wide range of trade-
restricting instruments. Not only are conventional trade policy
measures (tariffs and quotas) included, but exchange rate
policies, capital controls, and policies towards inward foreign
investment are also undergoing change. Liberalization seems to
have got underway in the early to mid-1980s in some countries,
and only more recently in others. In some cases it has steadily
gained momentum over these years and in others an initial surge
of liberalization has been followed by only slow further change.
Previous episodes of liberalization in the developing world, most
3notably in Latin America, have not persisted,2. A central issue
for these liberalizations is whether they can also endure.
The paper emphasizes that the liberalization pattern is
different across broad continental country groups. In Asia,
where growth has been underway for some years and each year an
ever enlarging number of countries seem to be growing at high
rates, the picture is one of sustained and, in many cases,
accelerating liberalization. In the Asian NIC5 and near NICs,
including Thailand, Indonesia and Malaysia, the liberalization
process seems well underway and reasonably firmly entrenched.
What we are now seeing in addition, is initial flirtation with
liberalization in lower income countries, such as India, who for
many years have been strongly resistant to liberalization.
In Africa the picture seems to be one of a remarkable
turnaround in policydirection. Major changes in foreign
exchange arrangements have occurred in a large number of
countries where, from independence onwards, trade measures had
slowly become ever more restrictive through to the mid—1980s.
The relative success of recent exchange rate realignments and
currency floating has led some countries to also reduce tariffs
and lessen the coverage of quotas. Conditionality in IMF and
World Bank lending programs has clearly been a major factor
2 See the discussion of previous liberalization attempts in
Bhagwati (1978) and Krueger (1978), who summarize the results of
individual country studies in a larger nine—country NBER project.
See also Little, Scitovsky and Scott (1970) and Balassa and
Associates (1982).
4underlying policy changes in this region, but this is not the
only reason for change.
In Latin and Central America, trade policy, like domestic
policy, remains somewhat erratic and lacking in stability. What
seems to be underway at present, however, is substantial
rethinking on trade strategies in a number of countries, and a
willingness to use increased openness of the economy as a way of
lending more stability to domestic policy. Mexico is perhaps the
clearest example of significant liberalization, but rethinking of
approaches is evident in Brazil and Argentina, even if change in
these two countries thus far is less dramatic.
Many factors underlie these liberalizations. There is
rethinking clearly discernable of the basic approach adopted
towards trade policy in a number of countries, with less
commitment than earlier to import substitution and more interest
in outward—oriented development strategies. Conditionality
associated with World Bank and IMF lending programs appears to be
important in Africa, and in some of the Asian and Latin American
countries. In some cases, sector—specific liberalization has
also been the result of bilateral pressure from the U.S. and the
European Community. Recent strong macro performance in the
developed world has also generated substantial growth in foreign
exchange earnings for developing countries, and facilitated this
liberalization. Particularly important has been the sustained
recovery of the OECD economies from the 1981 recession, and the
5large trade deficit which the United States has run in the mid—
1980s.
Will these liberalizations persist, and possibly further
accelerate? As with all liberalization, one can find grounds for
skepticism at the same time that one sees reasons for optimism.
Other smaller waves of liberalization in the l960s and 70s,
especially in Latin America, have not lasted. However, this set
of recent changes in policy appear to be more extensive and
reflect deeper intellectual change than characterized forner
episodes. The paper concludes by suggesting that, in the short
to mediun term, some reciprocal actions by the developed
countries in the GATT Uruguay Round would help in keeping
domestic political support for these liberalizations alive.
What happens will also depend on the performance of the OECD
economies in providing continued growth in export earnings for
developing countries.
6II RECENT TRADE LThERALIZATION IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES -
WHAT IT IS
Recent trade liberalization in developing countries takes
different forms in different countries. Its notable features are
its extent by country and its wide-ranging coverage across both
financial and real-side trade restrictions.
As is well known, the trade regime in most developing
countries is complex, reaching out well beyond the tariffs that
trade theorists conventionally analyze to a wide array of both
trade-restricting and trade-promoting measures. Trade—
restricting measures include quotas (quantitative restrictions),
rationed foreign exchange, advance deposit schemes, export taxes,
and export bans. Trade-promoting measures can include duty
remissions on inputs for re—export, free trade zones,
prioritization in credit rationing, registration schemes for
importers which require re—export, and other devices. What
constitutes liberalization is not always clear, and measuring its
extent is even more difficult. As a result, there has been
little in the analytical literature that indicates exactly how
one measures the degree of liberalization.
Despite these problems, there seems to be unmistakable
evidence that liberalization in the developing world is both
underway and extensive. Table 1 summarizes recent liberalization
experience in eleven developing countries participating in the
Ford Foundation-supported project on developing countries and the
global trading system. As a by-product of project activities,
7Table 1
SUIARY OF RECENT TRADE LIBERALIZATION EXPERIENCE IN
11 DEVELOPING COUNTRIES PARTICIPATING
IN A FORD FOUNDATION-SUPPORTED PROJECT ON
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND THE GLOBAL TRADING SYSTEM 1
Argentina
— Liberalization initiated in 1987.
— Product coverage of quantitative restrictions reduced from 62.3 percent to 36.1
percent of imports.
- September 1988 - coverage nf quantitative restrictions further reduced to 18
percent; expected to decline to 15 percent in early 1989.
- Substantial reduction in import licensing.
— In second half of 1988. average tariff reduced to 30 percent and tariff structure
rationalized within a range nf 5 to 40 percent.
Brazil
-- July 1988, tariff reform program went into effect.
- Measures included new customs tariff with lowered rates for many items.
- Elimination of tariff exemption program.
— Average nominal import tariff reduced from 51 to 40 percent (although moat
nominal tariff rates are lowered, the reform is expected to have neutral effect
on average tariff)
- Two domestic taxes levied on most imports abolished.
— Some reduction in non—tariff meamores.
China
— Open-door poiicy initiated in 1978.
- Four special economic zones established in 1980—81, followed by opening of
fourteen coastal cities.
— Island of Hainan opened to trade in 1984.
- Major trade reform package announced in 1987 included more decision—making power
to foreign trade and export—oriented enterprises, reduction or exemption of taxes
on exports, redistribution of foreign exchange earnings in favour of enterprises
making finished products.
Costa Rica
- Revised trade policy in 1982 with major emphasis on improving export capacity.
- Foreign exchange market reorganized and stabilized in 1982 and 1983.
- Now applies Common External Tariff of Central American Common Market.
- Exports promoted through export cuntrsct regime of temporary import admission and
free export processing zones.
1 See Whalley (1989) where the research papers and other output from this prolect
is described, and where more detail is available.
8India
- Snme trade liberalization and export promotion measures initiated in 1985.
- In 1988. India reduced tariffs on 300 agricultural itema.
- The auxiliary customs duty was reduced or abolished for many items.
-
— 50 products liberalized in July.
- Around 750 items were added to the list of products eligible for Open General
Licensing, which, in effect, allows for quota-free importation if foreign
exchange can be obtained.
- Trade liberal.ization initiated in 1980 as part of a structural adjustment
program.
— Reforms included reduction of non—tariff barriers, lowering of import duties and
depreciation of Kenyan currency.
- In 1986, duties on a range of imports eliminated or reduced.
Korea
- Liberalization process launched in 1978 and accelerated in early 1980a.
- Three year pian announced in 1988 to exempt ali manufactured goods of
oiscrctionary import licensing along with as many agricultural products as
possible.
- Between 1989 and 1993, tariffs expected to be reduced annually to an overall
average of 8 percent.
- Average tariff on non-agricultural products will be reduced to 6 percent by 1993,
while average on agricultural products will be 17 percent.
Mexico
- July 1985. significant import permit liberalization program aunched.
- At the time. 3,600 out of 4,400 tarIff items controlled by quantitative
restrictions were liberalized.
- By end 1987, coverage of quantitative restrictions had been reduced to 24 percent
of trade.
- Maximum tariff now reduced to 20 percent ad valorem from 100 percent before 1985.
- Average tariff declined to 10 percent from 23 percent.
- Effective January 1988, Mexico eliminated "official prices" for customs valuation
purposes.
Nigeria
- Major trade liberalization initiated in 1986 as part of structural adjustment
program.
- Previous import licensing system abolished September 1986.
- 30 percent import levy discontinued.
- Tariff reform resulted in substantial cuts in import duties.
— October 1986, exchange rate system restructured. Second—tier foreign exchange
market established - exchange rate now market-determined.
— 1987, advance payment of import duties reduced from 100 percent to 25 percent.
9Nigeria (continued)
— Import of raw materials and intermediate goods for use in manufacturing industry
and production of exported gooda free of duty or other indirect taxes and
charges.
The Philippines
— Phase I of import liberalization program (1981—1987) import controls
liberalized on 2.185 items.
— Temporarily suspended 1984—1985 due to balance—of—payments crisis.
— Phase II of programs covers remaining 637 items still covered by import controls.
List A of 104 items to be liberalized before end 1989. List B of 453 items to he
decided before end 1989. List C of 114 items to be restricted indefinitely for
health, safety and security reasons.
— Under Tariff Reform Program (1981—1985), average tariff lowered from 43 percent
to 28 percent.
Tanzania
— Liberalization undertaken in 1984 when own-funds scheme implemented.
— Mid—1986 Economic Recovery Program launched.
— Measures inciuded significant exchange rate adjustments, adjustment in interest
rates, increases in producer prices in real terms for export crops, and a
significant reduction in the number of price—controlled items.
- Reforms expected to he implemented in 1989 include: reduction in import
restrictions and reduction in use of administrative allocation of foreign
exchange. rationalization of tariffs and sales taxes, liberalization in internal
trade and pricing and improved export incentives.
Sourcem: Whailey )ed.) (1989)
UNCTAD (1988) TD/8/1196
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information on recent changes in trade policies has been
generated in all the eleven countries involved (Argentina.
Brazil, China, Costa Rica, India, Kenya, Mexico, Nigeria, the
Philippines, Korea, and Tanzania). The picture which emerges is
that in one form or another, trade liberalization appears to be
underway in all of these countries, although at varying speeds
and with differing degrees of commitment.
One particularly striking example is Mexico3 which has
witnessed both major rethinking on trade and development
strategies in policy circles in the last few years, and
significant liberalization. Its trade liberalization efforts
were initiated in mid-1985, and by the end Of 1987 the coverage
of quantitative restrictions (import licensing and/or official
reference prices) had been reduced to 24 percent of trade.
During this period, the maximum tariff was reduced to 20 percent
from 100 percent, and the average tariff declined to 10 percent
from 23 percent.
Korea4 is another example of a developing country which has
liberalized in a major way. Recent liberalization measures
include a three—year plan to free all manufactured goods and as
many agricultural products as possible from discretionary import
licensing. Between 1989 and 1993, tariffs will fall to an
overall average level of 8 percent. The average tariff on non-
3 See Bucay and Perez Motta (1987), Bueno and Viilarreai
(1988) and IMF Survey (1988a).
4 See Young (1988). See also Financial Times, August 23,
1988.
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agricultural products will come down to 6 percent by 1993, while
the average on agricultural products will be lowered to 17
percent.
There has also been extensive change in Africa. In Kenya,5
a major liberalization of import licensing began in 1980 and
adjustment of the tariff regime has been underway since 1981. In
1986, duties on a range of imports were eliminated or reduced.
In Nigeria6 an adjustment program has been in operation since
1986, under which import licensing has been abolished and the
number of items subject to import bans has been reduced. Bans on
food exports have been lifted, and other export bans and most
export licensing requirements have been eliminated. A major
reform of the exchange rate system was also introduced in 1986
through a second-tier foreign exchange market in which the
exchange rate is market—determined. Tanzania7 has also recently
undertaken an adjustment program that involves comparable
liberalization elements.
Many other countries in Africa which followed an import
substitution strategy upon independence in the early 1960s have
also begun to liberalize in recent years, and some in a major
way.8 It is unfair to claim that these changes reflect only a
See Ikiara (1987), also IMF (1987).
6 See Oyejide (1987), also IMF (1987).
See Lipumba (1987, 1989), also IMF (1987).
8 Beyond the three countries included in the Ford
Foundation-supported project, there has been extensive
liberalization elsewhere in Africa. This includes Burundi )l986-
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re—evaluation of their import substitution strategies, since in
Africa pressures from conditionality through World Bank and IMF
lending programs have also been important. But, despite the
pressures from conditionality, adopting import—liberalizing and
88): adoption of a flexible exchange rate policy; liberalizaUon
of exchange controls; reduction in the number of import items
prohibited or under licence; a restructuring of import tariffs to
reduce effective protection; Congo (1985—88): gradual
liberalization of import and exchange controls; Gabon (1986-88):
liberalization of import controls, liberalization of payments
arrangements; Gambia (1985—88): reduced use of quantitative
import restrictions, liberalized payments arrangements, exchange
rate adjustments including a float±ng rate; Ghana (1983-88):
liberalization of payments arrangements, auction marker for
foreign exchange, freeing of import licensing system; Guinea
(1985—88): flexible exchange rate system, liberalization of
payments arrangement through freeing of restrictions on current
transactions, reduction in use of quantitative import controls;
Guinea—Bissau (1983—88): liberalization of the exchange rate
system, abolition of import/export monopolies of state
enterprises, liberalized payments arrangements; Madagascar (1986-
88) import liberalization, flexible exchange rate system;
Mauritania (1985-88): liberalized import and exchange controls
through less reliance on quantitative import restrictions and
more flexible exchange rate system; Mauritius (1982—86):
flexible exchange rate policy after two large devaluations,
liberalized import regulations and payments arrangements;
Mozambique (1987-88): adjustments in exchange rates to permit a
liberalIzed import and payments regime, reduction of price
control coverage; Niger (1983—88): liberalization of
international and external marketing arrangements, narrower scope
of price controls; Senegal (1980—88): phased elimination of
quantitative restrictions on imports, rationalization of tariff
structure to reduce effective protection; Sierra Leone (1986-88):
introduction of a flexible, market—determined exchange rate
system, liberalized trade and payments systems, accelerated
privatization of the rice import system; Somalia (1985—88):
reduction in foreign trade restrictions, introduction of floating
exchange rate system, provision of export incentives; Uganda
(1987—88): adjustments of the exchange rate and movement towards
a liberalized payments regime, reduced reliance on quantitative
restrictions; and Zaire (1983—88): drastic reform of the
exchange rate system resulting in a float of the currency,
liberalization of the trade regime, lifting of nearly all
controls on prices. The information in this footnote has kindly
been provided by Ademola Oyejide of the University of Ibadan, a
participant in the project mentioned above.
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export—promoting measures are widely seen in policy circles in
these countries as central to any new effort to reverse the
decline of their economies.
India9 has also been moving in a liberalization direction,
even if change thus far does not compare with Korea, Mexico and
Nigeria. Export promotion measures were emphasized first.l° In
1986, measures were introduced allowing the sale of raw materials
at international prices, the utilization of up to 10 percent of
foreign exchange earnings for export promotion purposes, and the
import of machinery duty free, or at low rates. More recently,
the pace of liberalization has accelerated further with a move of
a significant number of previously restricted items onto Open
General Licensing.
China is another country included in the Ford Foundation-
supported project which has been liberalizing its trade and
external sector policies. Its present open-door policy has been
in place since 1978.11 At the time, China had become aware that
it needed to attract foreign capital and technology to speed its
development. More recent policy changes have continued their
earlier approach of relaxing customs restrictions, lowering
See Agarwal (1989) and Manor (1987) for further discussion
of Indian trade policy.
10 See IMF (1987).
1 See Guo (1987) for more details. See also GATT (l988b).
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customs duties and introducing new measures to facilitate
trade. 12
Major trade liberalization has also occurred in the other
countries involved in the project: the Philippines, Costa
Rica,'3 Argentina,14 and Brazil. There are clear signs that a
re—evaluation of alternative policy approaches towards trade
matters is underway in all these countries. In the two latter
countries, there are concrete initial movements in the direction
of import liberalization and export promotion, and reflect a re-
evaluation of trade policy.
In short, in all of the eleven developing countries
represented in the project, there are clear and unmistakable
signs of recent moves towards iberalization. These range from
the dramatic (Mexico, Nigeria, and Korea) to the significant
(Costa Rica, Kenya, Tanzania, China, and the Philippines) to the
small but discernible with potentially major re—evaluations of
policy underway (Argentina, Brazil and India). The concern
everywhere seems to be the same; improving growth performance by
making the domestic economy more efficient, and achieving better
export performance through a more open trade policy for impOrts.
12 It was announced recently in March 1989, for instance,
that the 14,000 foreign investment enterprises in China would be
allowed to use not only renminbi, but also foreign exchange to
quote prices, settle accounts and sell their products. People's
Daily, February 22, 1989.
13 See Whalley (ed.)(1989).
14 For discussion of previous liberalization attempts in
Argentina, see Corbo and de Melo (1987), and Berlinski and
Schydlowsky (1982).
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The circumstances may differ by country, especially the weight
attached to IMF/World Bank conditionality, but the direction of
both thinking and implementation of policy appears the same.
This same picture of extensive developing country trade and
external sector liberalization can also be seen in other recent
policy documents covering similar issues to that addressed here.
For instance, the recent World Bank evaluation of experience with
adjustment lending (World Bank (1989)) reports on developments in
trade policy in 40 countries receiving adjustment lending. Table
2, which reproduces the World Bank's summary of their experience,
paints a similar picture to that emerging from the eleven Ford
Foundation-supported project countries. 15
Thus, in a range of developing countries it seems clear that
either major trade liberalization is underway, or is now being
seriously considered. The questions are why has this happened,
and will these liberalizations persist?
15 See UNCTAD (1988) which reports that during the payments
crisis of 1982, many Latin American countries increased import
restrictions, but recently have reversed these policies and in
some cases trade regimes are more liberal than before the crisis
(page 5). See also Laird and Nogues (1988) for discussion of
liberalization in heavily indebted countries.
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Table 2
WORLD RANK EVALUATIONS OF RECENT
TRADE POLICY DEVELOPMENTS IN 40 COUNTRIES RECEIVING ADJUSTMENT LENDING
Nuaber of Countries Where Reforms Have Been
Less Not
Area of Refors Significant Significant Negligible Total Present Present Total
Overall sport poiicya 19 10 II 40 — - -
QR5 on noncompetitive
imports 12 16 12 40 — — -
Protective QR5 12 17 11 40 - - -
Tariff Level 7 20 13 40 - - -
Tariff dispersion 8 22 10 40 — -- -
Protection level 13 26 1 40 — - -
Stheduie of future
reduction 6 29 5 40 - - -
Protection studies — — - - 28 12 40
Overall export policya 15 14 11 40 — - -
Exchange rateb — — — -- 38 2 40
Export promotionc — 33 7 40
Imports for exports 17 11 8 40 — -
Note: The assessments refer to proposals supported by the Bank. They do not necessarily
refer to policy implementation.
a Judgement on the significance of the overall reform proposals.
b Often these were not explicit conditions, but constitute understandings.
frequently made under the program.
Includes such schemes as export credits, insurance, guarantees. and -
institutional development.
Source: World Bank 119891
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III FACTORS UNDERLYING RECENT DEVELOPING COUNTRY TRADE
LIBERALIZATION
Many factors lie behind the recent developing country trade
and external sector liberalizations described in the previous
section.
Intellectual Influences
In part, this recent liberalization experience reflects new
thinking on trade natters in developing countries. The essence
of the process is two-fold; a re—evaluation of the nerits of
inport substitution development strategies on the one hand,16 and
a growing appreciation of the importance of maintaining as open a
trading systen as possible on the other. The latter factor was
accentuated in the early to mid-l9SOs by the concern that
developed countries would turn increasingly protectionist towards
developing countries and make access for manufactured exports
even more difficult.
The need to look again at import substitution strategies can
be traced to a variety of influences. One is the perception that
import substitution strategies have not worked as well as was
hoped in the l9bOs and 60s. Rather than promoting growth, they
16 A recent GATT document notes, for instance, that "Brazil
has reportedly abandoned its traditional industrial development
policy of import substitution and switched emphasis to a strategy
of 'competitive integration' with the world economy." GATT
(l988b) Doc. L/6366, p.123. The Philippine tariff reform program
of 1981—85 also reflects a conscious effort to move towards a
more export-oriented industrialization strategy and away from the
import substitution strategy of the late 1950s to the l970s. See
Philippine Tariff Commission (1988), internal document.
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are now seen in some countries as having spawned domestic
inefficiency and created a bureaucracy to administer import
controls. Importantly, such policies are also seen as inhibiting
export performance. 17,18
The allegedly stronger performance of those developing
countries which have been more outward-oriented in their trade
strategies has been central to the debate on these matters. The
performance of the Asian NICs, and particularly Korea, has
frequently been held up as a prime example of how import
substitution trade strategies have failed, while outward-
oriented trade strategies have succeeded.19
During the period that Korea dramatically increased its
growth rate (from the early 1960s through to the late l970s), it
maintained most of its existing protection, using import duty
remissions for export industries instead. It was major export
promotion programs which moved the economy towards trade
17 Much of the criticism of import substitution strategies
in Latin America, and especially in Brazil, seems to be directed
as much at impairment of export performance through higher input
costs and lower quality as it is at broader developmental
concerns.
18 According to the World Bank (1983) for instance, the
Kenyan Fourth Development Plan (1979-83) recognized that 'the
process of industrialization through import substitution had
inhibited the growth of exports and agriculture". page 95.
19 Influential studies supporting an outward—oriented
approach to development include Krueger (1978), Bhagwatj (1978,
1988), and Balassa (1978, 1982). See also World Bank (1987) and
UN (1985).
19
neutrality and substantially changed Korea's trade dependency,20
not conventional trade liberalization. Only subsequently did
reductions in tariffs occur. This has led to a confused debate
over whether Korean experience shows that a freer trade policy
stimulates growth.
While abandonment of import substitution is an over-
simplification of what happened in the early period of high
Korean growth, the statement that growth in exports was crucial
to Korean growth seems incontrovertible, even though free trade
was not the chosen route in the early years. A pattern of high
export growth following a move from trade repressing import
substitution towards a more neutral system of incentives also
occurred in other developing countries in the 1960s, including
countries such as Brazil. Many of these countries, however,
subsequently reverted to a more traditional import substitution
approach.
Thus, the issue which current trade policy debates in
developing countries are wrestling with is whether import
substitution helps domestic manufacturing industries grow so they
cam later become important in world markets, or whether it simply
generates inefficient protected domestic industries and the
economy is ultimately prevented from obtaining the benefits of
access to more efficient foreign products. The comparison
between high—growth economies in Asia on the one hand, and low—
20 See Young (1987), Westphal and Kim (1982), Lee and Maya
(1988) and Luedde-Neurath (1986) for more details of the Korean
experience.
20
growth economies in Africa and Latin America on the other, has
been part of this debate.21
The view that import substitution strategies have not worked
well is especially strong in those countries which have made high
export growth and economic diversification a top policy priority.
In these, achieving efficient domestic production, as opposed to
reducing imports, is becoming the new goal of industrial
policy.22 Increasingly, the view is heard that the solution to
their development problems lies in more trade involvement rather
than iess.23 This represents a fundamental change in the stance
of policy toward both trade and industrialization in a
significant part of the developing world, compared to the views
which prevailed previously.
Global Macro Conditions
A further factor which has been central to recent trade
liberalization in developing countries is the performance of the
global macro economy in the mid to late l980s. Since the
21 See Whalley (1987) for data on recent growth rates of
countries covered by the Ford Foundation—supported project.
22 GATT (1988a), page 7, reports that "momentum in world
merchandise trade accelerated in 1987 because of the sharp
turnaround in the import demand of the developing areas". Import
volume increased 3 percent in 1987 after a substantial reduction
in 1986.
23 GATT (1988a) page 7, notes that in developing countries
with increases over 10 percent in the volume of merchandise
exports in 1987, they also recorded high import volume increases,
lending support to the notion that dynamic exporters are dynamic
importers.
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recession of 1981, the worst since the 1930s, there has been
strong growth in the developed world; in sone years averaging 4
percent in real terms across a:: OKOD bountries.24 It is well
known that trade growth is typically considerably higher than
incone growth. Over the post-war years, global trade has crown
at around 4 percent per year, whereas real incone growth has
averaged aprroxinately 1 percent per year in per capita terms.
O!CD ONP ;rcwth, therefore, has itself fueled growth in the
extcrt earnings of develooing countries26 and marticularly in
those of tne Asian Nba. Oornbusch (1986) suggests that an extra
point of GO? growth in the developed countries contributes about
2 to '3 percent to the export revenue growth of non-oil developing
countries. In the rase of Korea, Taiwan and other NIOs, export
earnings have :ncreased by large orders of magnitude in the
decade of the :980s.
The I )nhs between global macro conditions and trade
liberalization in developing countries arise largely because of
the payments regime which most developing countries typically
pursue. This is one of fixed or controlled exchange rates along
24 OFCD countries recorded the folowing growth rates of
real GN?/GDP; 1983 — 2.9 percent; 1984 — 5.1 percent; 1985 — '3.4
percent; 1986 — 2.7 percent; 1987 — 3.4 percent. See 0500 (1288)
page 166.
25 See :<ravis, Neeten and Summers (1982), page 9.
26 In 198T, the developing countries sold more than two-
thirds of their merchandise exports to the developed countries.
See GATT (198Sa) page 16.
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with other external sector restrictions designed to insulate the
economy from external shocks. Developing countries' trade tends
to react directly and in a positive direction to any weakening of
the foreign exchange constraint which they face. Thus, when
export earnings increase as sharply as they have in recent years,
imports respond directly as foreign exchange availability
improves and its rationing becomes looser.27 In part, the
liberalization which we are now seeing, particularly that part of
it which is evident in changed exchange rate and payments
arrangements, is a reaction to the weakening of the foreign
exchange constraint which developing countries have placed
themselves under through their choice of payments regime. Should
these global macro conditions deteriorate, then an unwinding of
the recent liberalization could occur as foreign exchange
rationing tightens.
The role of these macro factors in facilitating trade
liberalization in developing countries has been reinforced by
other factors in the global economy of the 1980s. The behaviour
of the U.S. trade deficit has been especially important.28
Beginning in 1984, the U.S. trade deficit moved from relatively
small orders of magnitude to deficits in the region of $150
27 This is the old notion of "automatic reciprocity"; the
idea that any increases of export earnings by developing
countries are automatically reciprocated in the form of increased
imports from developed countries. See Prebisch (1964) and
Johnson (1967).
28 In 1987, the U.S. current account deficit reached $161
billion. GATT (1988a) page 20.
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billion a year where it stayed for a number of years before
recently starting to fall. Much of the recent growth in export
earnings by developing countries is accounted for specifically by
increased penetration of U.S. markets. Sampson (1986) reports,
for instance, that 80 percent of the growth in export earnings of
developing countries in the early 1980s was attributable solely
to increased exports to the U.S. If U.S. fiscal and monetary
policies change and the trade deficit falls, it will inevitably
have serious implications for developing countries and their
liberalization efforts.29 Reversal of the U.S. trade deficit
through changed macro policies could, therefore, substantially
weaken the impetus to further liberalization in the developing
world.
World Bank/IMF Conditionality and Developed Country Pressure
A further factor underlying recent liberalization in
developing countries has been the pressure to which some of them
have been subjected to liberalize through conditionality in the
lending programs of the World Bank and the IMF.3° These
pressures have been compounded by the new aggressive trade policy
stance taken by some of the larger developed countries towards
developing countries, and particularly the United States, through
29 Dornbusch (1986) argued that in the short term,
developing countries would benefit from "the most reckless
spending and money printing imaginable".
30 See the discussion of conditionality in Helleiner (1986)
and Williamson (1983).
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bilateral threats of GSP graduation and other actions unless
liberalization occurs. The latter component of trade policy has
been applied most strongly to the Asian NICs and Brazil,
countries which have higher income per capita than other
developing countries, and often more liberal trade policies.
Threats of unilateral developed country actions applied
specifically against individual countries, such as GSP
graduation, 201 and 301 actions have been used with some success
to cajole countries into more liberalization. Some of this
pressure has been product-specific (such as beef and tobacco in
the case of Korea), while other pressure has been targeted to
non-tradtionai trade areas such as intellectual property
matters 3l
There is little doubt that bilateral pressure has had some
effect on developing country trade policies. But it seems quite
small compared to the broad sweep of trade liberalization
described above. It is also localized to a small number of high-
income growing economies who have significant trade in
manufactures and, therefore, can be threatened in this way.
31 The 1985 Korean ban on beef imports resulted in severe
bilateral pressure from the U.S. to liberalize. In July 1988,
Korea announced the ban would be replaced by a 14,000 tonne
import quota (UNCTAD (1988) page 5). In 1988, the U.S.
threatened to graduate Singapore from its GSP scheme if Singapore
did not take steps to stop infringing on U.S. copyright and
trademarks. After taking the necessary measures, the U.S.
graduated Singapore anyway. In August 1987, Taiwan "gave in to
long—standing U.S. pressure to reduce its 4 percent import tax,
disguised as a harbour duty fee. It was reduced to 0.75
percent." EIU Country Report Taiwan, 4, 1987, page 14.
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A larger and more pervasive influence has been World Bank
and IMF conditionality. Bank/Fund conditionality reflects
lending by these agencies which requires countries to make
changes in a number of policy areas, including in the external
sector. According to the IMF (1988b, pages 32—33), reduction of
quantitative restrictions (QRs) was the most common type of
specific trade liberalization measure included in Fund programs
in the last three years. QRs were required to be reduced in
approximately 25 percent of countries granted stand—by or
extended arrangements in 1985, and about 50 percent in 1986—87.
Tariff reform has also featured prominently and is often
undertaken in collaboration with World Bank programs and support.
Comprehensive tariff reforms are typically implemented according
to a phased schedule accompanying a gradual reduction of QRs.
Other types of trade liberalization in Fund-supported
programs have included liberalization or abolition of importers'
licences; rationalization of the exchange rate used for customs
valuation; and abolition of import or export monopolies.
Typically, trade liberalization measures were not used as
performance criteria in lending, but were evaluated in the
context of overall reviews of performance. Conditionality seems
to have had the most influence in Africa where the external
sector problems and the need for adjustment lending has been.
largest.32 The leverage of these agencies over policy has been
32 See the work by Greenaway and Mimer (forthcoming) on
Madagascar, who emphasize the role of conditionality in recent
African trade policy developments.
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significant because of the need for developmental assistance, and
the capability of domestic governments to formulate policy has
often been weak.33
It is, however, possible to over—estimate the extent and
influence of conditionality on the liberalization process in
other countries. In Latin America, the reaction to these lending
programs has, on occasion, been to turn down offers of financial
assistance from the Bank and Fund and pursue their chosen
country
policies independently. Equally, in some of the Latin American
countries the volume of lending involved has often been
relatively small compared to total external sector transactions.
For instance, in the Mexican case, although it is sometimes
claimed that conditionality has been important in shaping recent
trade policy initiatives, in practice this does not seem to have
been so because the lending involved was small compared to
reserves and trade flows.
Nonetheless, Bank/Fund conditionality and pressure from
developed countries Is undoubtedly a factor in shaping the new
33 African countries' share in IMF assistance under the
stand—by and extended facilities reached 30 percent in 1979—80
compared to 3 percent for 1970-78. African countries accounted
for 53 percent of the total of stand-by and extended
arrangements
signed in 1979—80 compared to an annual average of 20 percent for1970—78. However, earlier African experience with high—
conditionality loans has been mixed. Out of the twenty African
stand-by arrangements concluded with the Fund between 1982 and
1984, six were not totally used before the deadline or
cancellation date and two were cancelled. Of the nine African
agreements concluded under the extended facility between 1975 and
1983, eight were not totally used at the deadline or cancellationdate and one was replaced by a stand-by agreement. Of the eight
agreements not entirely used, five were cancelled. See Mawakanj
(1986) pages 107—109.
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trade and payments regimes in the developing world. Its
influence in lower income, smaller debtor countries where
alternative sources of funding are not easily available and
developmental assistance is needed (as in Africa), is especially
large.
There are, therefore, a range of influences which have been
important in determining the coverage and speed of recent
developing country trade liberalization. There include
intellectual factors which challenge traditional import
substitution approaches to development and, in part, reflect the
aging of a policymaking bureaucracy raised in the 1950s and 60s
and its slow replacement by more neoclassicist-inclined
technocrats who, entered government in the l970s. There is also
the desire to improve economic performance through enhanced
export competitiveness. There are the macro factors including
sustained OECD growth in the 1980s, and the stimulative effect of
the U.S. trade deficit on developing country export earnings.
And there are pressures from conditionality in Bank and Fund
lending programs and threatened bilateral trade actions by
developed countries if liberalization does not occur.
All of these need to be factored in to understand why these
liberalizations are now occurring in so many countries, and in
assessing where they may be headed in the future.
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IV HOW DOES RECENT EXPERIENCE COMPARE TO PREVIOUS EPISODES OF
TRADE LIBERALIZATION?
In trying to assess where this liberalization may go next;
whether it will persist, accelerate, or dissipate its momentum;
it is helpful to compare what is going on at present in the
developing world to previous liberalization episodes. These have
been largely concentrated in Asia and Latin America, but because
they have produced sharply different experiences they are worth
studying n some detail.
In the Latin American case, in countries such as Brazil,
Chile and Argentina, initial and rapid liberalization experiments
in ti'e 1960s and 70s proved to be unsustainable in the longer
run. The hoped for supply response on the export side never
materialized, balance-of--payments problems intensified, and
eventually the liberalizations collapsed. In contrast, in the
Asian NICs and near NICs (Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, Indonesia and
others), trade liberalization has been much more incremental.
Initial steps were small and less dramatic than in Latin America.
Balance-of-payments problems have arisen, but these have not
reversed the liberalization, which has been sustained in the
longer run. The experience of other countries, such as India,
has instead involved single unsuccessful liberalization attempts
(1966 in India's case) which have undermined support for any
repeat attempt. A sense of some of these different country




The government which took over in the April 1964 coup began
a trade liberalization episode in Brazil which lasted until 1973.
For the first time in three decades, Brazil moved away from a
development strategy based on import substitution. Exports were
encouraged by a more flexible exchange rate policy, as well as by
the elimination of taxes, licensing procedures and other
restrictions. In addition, fiscal reform allowed for the
introduction of tax rebates and duty drawbacks which did not
exist previously.
Specific export credit facilities to finance production and
sales were introduced, as well as specific export promotion
programs such as BEFIEX. Under the BEFIEX Agreements in the
early 1970s, a large number of firms (particularly in the
automobile sector) undertook long-term export commitments (for
10-year periods) in exchange for a package of incentives which
included duty—free imports of machinery and inputs, income and
value-added tax exemptions and other fiscal subsidies. Also
during this period, there was some import liberalization.
Tariffs were reduced in 1966—67 such that the effective rate of
protection for the industry as a whole was reduced from 108
percent to 63 percent.
The oil price increases of 1973 and the resulting
deterioration of the Brazilian terms of trade eventually led to a
' This section draws heavily on World Bank (1983). See
also Abreu and Fritsch (1987).
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return to import substitution policies during the late 1970s,
although with a continued emphasis on expanding manufactured
exports. The severity of import restriction then intensified
further with the debt problems of the early 1980s.
India35
India followed an import substitution development strategy
in both the immediate post-independence period, and in the period
1956-61. This was strengthened by the imposition and
consolidation of the quantitative restriction regime to control
imports. Despite this, the period 1962—66 was one of "partial
and halting efforts at liberalization".36
This was because there was some export subsidization to
reduce the effects of the overvalued currency. There were also
steady efforts to unify import duties as well as attempts to
streamline the industrial licensing system. On the 6th of June,
1966, however, the Indian rupee was devalued by 57.5 percent in
what was considered a major liberalization announcement. In
addition to the devaluation, the full policy package consisted
of:
"i) a substantial elimination of the export incentives on
non—traditional exports, a simultaneous imposition of
-
countervailing duties to offset the devaluation on
traditional exports where oligopolistic competition from
rival suppliers was expected (as on tea) and a significant
reduction of the high import duties;
This section draws heavily on Shagwati and Srinivasan (1975).
36 See Bhagwati and Srinivasan (1975) page 76.
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(ii) a significant increase in the availability of aid-
financed imports, accompanied by official declaration and
implementation of a policy of liberalized import
licensing. "7
There were two major factors behind this devaluation. On
the one hand, the exchange rate adjustment fitted in with the
government's earlier attempts to reduce the effects of the
overvaluation through export subsidies. On the other hand, the
Aid India Consortium had nade major devaluation a precondition
forthe resumption of aid.
However, the liberalization did not last long. Even in 1966
there was subsidization of major non-traditional exports. By
1968—70 differential export subsidies nerged at significant
levels, the quantitative restriction regime continued as did the
principle of automatic protection and industrial licensing. The
restrictive regime of the past slowly returned.
Argentina38
Argentina experienced a major liberalization episode between
1976-81, when it was hoped that such measures would eliminate
price distortions and help reorganize the economy. In the past,
Argentineeconomic policy (as in other Southern Cone countries)
had revolved around an import substitution strategy characterized
by "expansionary demand policies combined with fixed or slowly
See Bhagwati and Srinivasan (1975) page 84.
38 See Berlinski and Schydlowsky (1982), the flU Country
Profile Argentina 1988—89 page 10, Preusse (1988), and Corbo and
de Melo (1987).
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adjusting exchange rates, price controls and restrictive trade
regimes'.39
By the 1970s, Argentina's system of import restrictions
consisted of prohibitive tariffs, official customs valuations,40
advance deposits for imports, and preferential arrangements with
the Latin American Free Trade Area (LAFTA). In addition, special
import regimes existed for a number of industries.
In April 1976 a trade liberalization program began with the
progressive removal of prior deposit requirements and quotas on
imports. Exchange rates were consolidated from a multiple—rate
system to a dual-rate system, which were subsequently merged in
December. Further major liberalization followed in 1978-79 when
the prior deposit requirement was eliminated, and a program
announced to reduce tariffs to an average 16 percent. Export
taxes were to be eliminated by 1986.
In 1980, there were small devaluations in September and
October. However, the overvalued exchange rate, combined with
high interest rates, was unsustainable. Severe financial strains
led to bank failures in 1980. In 1981, a change of military
presidents coincided with massive capital flight and the collapse
of the peso and an eventual return to the protection of old.
39 Corbo and de Melo (1987) page 112.
40 According to Preusse (1988) page 890, about "14 percent
of tariffs on imports were calculated on the basis of so—called
aforo prices which reflected arbitrary valuations by customs
authorities rather than c.i.f. market prices".
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Chile41
Prior to 1973 Chile had followed an import substitution
strategy and was suffering from low rates of growth, a large
fiscal deficit, high rates of inflation and severe shortage of
foreign exchange. While some liberalization had been attempted
in 1956-62 and again in the late 60s, the government had reverted
to a restrictive trade regime each time. According to Corbo and
de Melo (1987), the effective rate of protection to domestic
sales in Chile at this time was 151 percent.
A major liberalization program was undertaken in late 1973
when the multiple exchange rate was replaced by a three-tier
system, and followed by a 300 percent devaluation. Between 1973
and 1974, quotas were removed and the average tariff was reduced
from 105 percent to 69 percent and the maximum tariff from 750
percent to 140 percent. In 1975 a unified exchange rate was
introduced, and in 1976, a new tariff structure was proposed with
rates of 25 percent for primary, 30 percent for semi—manufactured
and 35 percent for manufactured goods. In 1977, devaluation was
linked to the consumer price index. Following Chile's withdrawal
from the Andean Pact, effective tariffs of 10 to 35 percent were
proposed with implementation by mid-1977. A uniform tariff of 10
percent was set in 1979.
41. This section is based on Corbo and de Melo (1987),
Preusse (1988), the EIU Country Profile Chile 1987—88, and UNCTAD
(1988) TD/B/1196.
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Subsequently, capital flight and balance-of-payments
problems intervened. In June 1982, the fixed exchange rate was
abandoned and a three—tier exchange rate system came into
operation. In March 1982, the uniform tariff rate was raised to
20 percent and 35 percent in 1984 after pressure from domestic
industry for protection. However, unlike that in other Latin
American countries the liberalization was able to stabilize
itself and resume its liberalization direction. Tariffs were
lowered again to 20 percent in 1985 reflecting the governments
intention to follow an open-market policy. By 1988, the uniform
tariff rates were lowered to 10 percent and a 30 percent surtax
on imports of luxury consumer goods abolished. Import licences
as such are no longer required in Chile, but all requests for
imports require a document issued by the Central 3ank. Chile is
also liberal in its relative lack of foreign investment
restrictions.
Korea42
Korea followed an import substitution strategy during the
1950s and early 1960s. In 1959, high tariffs were imposed on
imports, especially finished consumer goods for which there were
domestic substitutes. Other finished goods and luxury items were
also subject to high tariffs. Tariffs were lower on products not
produced domestically. Low tariffs were also imposed or
42 This section draws on Westphal and Kim (1982), Young
(1987) and Whalley (ed.) (1989).
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unfinished goods. Feed grains and non-competitive imports of
equipment and raw materials entered duty-free. Several major
import substituting industries were exempted from tariffs on
imports of machinery and intermediate goods. In order to
partially offset the effects of an overvalued won, quantitative
import restrictions were used. Quotas were the principle means
of controlling inports, with import licences revised semi-
annual ly.
Liberalization began in 1959, but accelerated in the early
l960s. Export incentives were introduced in 1959, but were
substantially increased after the election of the civilian
governnent in 1964. Another significant change in 1964 was the
establishment of a uniform exchange rate. Trade controls were
gradually relaxed after the 1964 devaluation, and the number of
items eligible for unrestricted import increased, in the l970s,
the Korean government launched an aggressive program of promotion
of heavy industries as new export sectors. Liberalization was
halted, if not reversed, during this process which had resulted
in a serious loss of international competitiveness in the
manufacturing industry by the late l970s. This strategy was
abandoned and the gradual liberalization of the 60s resumed. The
tariff system was reformed in 1984 (after minor reforms in 1976
and 1978) resulting in the introduction of a five—year program of
tariff cuts. Tariffs on industrial products were reduced by
about a quarter over the period, while at the same time tariffs
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were made more uniform among different stages of processing.
Agricultural products were exempt from these tariff cuts.
Liberalization of the import licensing system followed in
1978, with further change in 1981. A medium-term program was
announced in 1983-84 with the aim of making most industrial
products free of quantitative restrictions by 1988.
A three-year plan was announced in 1988 to exempt all
manufactured goods of discretionary import licensing, along with
as many agricultural products as possible. Between 1989 and
1993, tariffs are expected to be reduced annually to an overall
average level of 8 percent. The average tariff on non-
agricultural products will be reduced to 6 percent by 1993, while
the average on agricultural products will be 17 percent.
There has also been a policy in place since 1984 of steadily
increasing the number of manufacturing and service industries in
which foreigners can invest. Foreigners are also being given
access to selected service industries such as banking,
securities, insurance and transportation. It has been the Korean
policy that liberalization would take place gradually, beginning
with licensing liberalization, then tariff reduction 1 the
industrial sector, with liberalization of agriculture and the
service sectors last.
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This summary represents sharply differing liberalization
experiences. It is, however, worth stressing that one major
difference between the current round of developing country trade
liberalization and these previous episodes is that the current
liberalization has a clearer global component to it, and is more
strongly driven by changed intellectual views in the developing
world on how trade policy and growth interact. It is spread
across many countries and its impacts on the relative
competitiveness of individual developing countries with each
other may help sustain it, as will the depth of intellectual
commitment which is involved.
The recent wave of liberalization attempts also reflects
clearer elements of concern over links to domestic economic
performance than in former liberalization episodes, and this may
also help limit its reversal. Mexico's 1986 entry into the GATT,
and subsequent liberalization has, in part, been motivated by the
idea of using increased openness to the international economy as
a way of disciplining domestic policies. Similar thinking seems
to be present in Nigeria's policy changes.
Also, if one looks at the liberalizations which occurred in
the 1960s and 70s, many of these were localized to particular
countries and the experiences were much more varied than in the
current episode, in India, for instance, there was great
frustration felt at the time of the 1966 devaluation because
there was an interruption of aid inflows at the same time (see
Agarwal (1989)). The Indian economy had partly redirected itself
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towards manufacturing as a result of the expectation of the
effects of the devaluation, but this was short—lived because of
limited foreign exchange availability once aid flows were cut.
This, in turn, eventually led to the termination of the
liberalization experiment. Liberalization episodes in Argentina
in 1976, and Brazil in the 1970s, had similar end results, but
the triggers which caused the end of liberalization were
different.
Current liberalization in Asia, and especially in the Asian
NICs (including Korea and Taiwan and now Thailand and Indonesia),
appears to be nore persistent than in other regions and in some
countries involves a sequential liberalization process43 which
spans twenty years or more. In the Korean case, Korea initially
liberalized by adopting export promotion strategies, not only
through duty remissions schemes, but also with priority
allocation of rationed credit and licensing arrangements. This
generated substantial growth in export earnings which, in turn,
43 The issue of the timing and sequence of steps in the
liberalization process is complex and has been the subject of
considerable debate. In a study of industrial and trade policies
in six developing countries, Little, Scitovsky and Scott (1970)
also drew attention to the drawbacks of maintaining a highly
protected import substitution-based trade regime too long, and
advocated a gradual transition to a more liberalized regime. In
their view, the transition should begin with the removal of
quotas and a devaluation of the exchange rate. Accompanying this
devaluation should be an adjustment of tariffs, export subsidies
and taxes such that internal prices are unchanged. Gradually, as
the transition proceeds, tariffs and export taxes would be
reduced. For more detailed discussion, see Little, Scitovsky and
Scott (1970) Chapter 10. For further discussion of timing and
sequencing of liberalization, see Edwards (1984) and Wolf (1986).
For discussion of African countries' experiences with exchange
rate liberalization in the l980s, see Harvey (1988).
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allowed further acceleration of the liberalization process. The
initial step in the Korean case was a move towards trade
neutrality via export promotion, rather than conventional trade
liberalization, per se. As has been suggested above, this
sustained liberalization in Asia now appears to be spreading to
other countries, and in the Asian case, seems to be both
accelerating and broadening.
In the African case, the experience seems to be that,
following independence, trade performance progressively
deteriorated44 and was accompanied by trade and financial
restrictions of increasing severity in many countries. There
were no serious attempts to liberalize as had occurred in Asia,
Latin America, and the Indian subcontinent. The African
experience thus has relatively few precedents with which to
compare it. As a result, the recent turnaround seems sharper and
more vigorous compared to liberalization elsewhere, and if
comparisons to earlier Latin American experience are at all
suggestive, potentially fragile in the longer term.
In summary then, this current liberalization is broadly
spread across a large number of developing countries.
Comparisons to previous episodes of liberalization are limited
primarily to Latin America and the Indian subcontinent, since
current liberalization in Asia is largely an acceleration and
broadening of previous efforts, and a relatively new experience
See the discussion of the Ghanaian case, for instance, in
Leith (1974).
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in Africa. What seems to be different this time around,
especially in Latin America, is the extent to which there is a
willingness to re-examine the intellectual basis for policy
reform, and to question previous deeply held commitments to
import substitution development strategies.
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V WILL THE PRESENT LIBERALIZATION CONTINUE, OR EVEN
ACCELERATE?
Just because current trade liberalization in developing
countries seems broader and more firmly intellectually based than
earlier episodes, it does not necessarily mean that this
liberalization is permanent. in many countries the domestic
political support for liberalization is weak, and other elements
of fragility are only too apparent.
Macro Conditions in OECD Countries
One reason why these liberalizations in developing countries
may prove fragile is the macro situation in the OECD countries.
The recovery of the OECD countries from the 1981 recession and
the growth of export earnings of developing countries this has
generated have been central in facilitating developing country
trade liberalization. A reversal of this growth in export
earnings through a combination of slowing OECO growth, a possible
recession, and a reversal of the U.S. trade deficit, could
sufficiently tighten foreign exchange constraints in enough
developing countries to put pressure on the liberalization.45
The liberalization programs in place in many developing
countries are intended, in part, to generate a flow of resources
from import—substituting industries into export industries in
these countries. This is crucial in order to generate enough
This could, however, be partly offset by lower interest
rates taking pressure off debt service costs for heavily indebted
countries.
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additional foreign exchange to further speed liberalization
through increased imports. If the global economy weakens, it has
strong rebound effects on developing country exports, especially
for commodities and raw materials, and the liberalizations
discussed above would be put in jeopardy.
Domestic Political Support for Liberalization
The relative lack of domestic political support for
liberalization in developing countries is also a major impediment
to any acceleration of liberalization, and may even be enough to
throw it into reverse. Popular support for trade liberalization
is usually weak and diffuse. Domestic support relies crucially
upon the supply response which liberalization is supposed to
generate. If the supply response is not there, if export
earnings do not increase, if growth rates are not higher than
before, and unemployment rates begin to fall, then little can be
shown to substantiate the claimed benefits for liberalization
which was their motivation in the first place. Weak political
support, therefore, makes either acceleration or continuation of
liberalization difficult.
It is becoming clear in a number of the developing countries
in which liberalization has been initiated in the last few years,
that it is now running into precisely these roadblocks (the
Philippines, for instance, is a good example).46 Little can be
46 Nigeria is also a case in point. It was felt in Nigeria
that by demonstrating its commitment to an "unhindered free
market economy", the country's creditworthiness and
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shown in terms of concrete results which substantiate the claims
of major improvements in economic performance attributable to the
liberalization, and hence the liberalization itself becomes
weaker and improvements in performance less likely.
Also, these liberalizations reflect a combination of
external circumstances which both facilitate and propel them.
Outside pressures through conditionality from the Bank and the
Fund are, of course, politically inflammatory and, therefore, one
of the threats to the continuation of liberalization.47 In many
countries liberalization is seen as a tool for developed—country—
dominated multilateral agencies to impose their policy views on
developing countries, and override national sovereignty and
autonomy. Hence, the support for liberalization weakens when it
is seen as driven by outside agencies.48
attractiveness to foreign investors would be restored. This so
far has not been the case and there is speculation the government
may well decide that the 'rewards of economic reform do not
justify the political risks'. (Africa Confidential Vol. 29, No.
1, 1988.) Political support for import liberalization is
weakening in the Philippines after imports increased
substantially more than exports in 1987. There is also
opposition to the IMF—backed economic recovery program in
Tanzania.
47 In March 1989, for example, there were riots and protests
in Venezuela against an IMF-backed package of policy changes.
48 Shams (1988) notes that adjustment programs would stand a
better chance for success if the IMF and World Bank formed
coalitions with important interest groups within the countries.
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The Lack of Binding of Liberalization
A further factor which nay affect the persistence or
otherwise of recent developing country liberalization is that
little or none of it is bound in a contractual sense in the GATT.
In some cases, it is linked to conditionality in Bank and Fund
lending for specific periods of tine (typically three to five
years) . But when the lending program terminates, there is
nothing which prevents a reversion to the original policy regime.
This has already happened in a number of cases.
The extent to which recent trade liberalization is further
reversed may thus, in part, be directly linked to the
participation of developing countries in global negotiations, and
especially the GATT Uruguay Round. If, for instance, developed
countries take significant initiatives towards developing
countries, and developing countries are prepared to bind their
recent liberalization in the GATT in return for concessions fron
developed countries, it makes the reversibility of this
liberalization less likely. Replacement of instruments abolished
by other policy instruments with similar effect is, however,
always a possibility.
A related issue is whether, and if so how, the external
sector is viewed by policymakers in developing countries as a
vehicle through which disciplines can be applied to domestic
policies, and cement perceived gains from increased stability in
the domestic policy regime. If external sector arrangements are
used, in part, to provide for more stability of the domestic
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policy regime through increased openness, then a willingness by
developing countries to go further and make liberalization more
secure through international bindings may, in the long run, prove
to be one of its main guarantors of non—reversibility.
Links to the Multilateral System
This, in turn, raises the question of wider 'inkage between
these developing country liberalizations and the multilateral
trading system. As has been argued in the report from the Ford
Foundation—supported project mentioned above (see Whalley
(1989)), recent developing country actions both on the unilateral
liberalization front and through their more active participation
in the multilateral framework of the Uruguay Round reflect
similar concerns. In the latter forum, they have submitted many
proposals and participated in coalitions.49
On the one hand, unilateral liberalization reflects concerns
over weak economic performance and attempts to improve economic
performance through increased openness. On the other hand,
heightened participation in multilateral fora reflects increased
outward—orientation in developmental thinking, and a recognition
that a closing of international markets can thwart development.
Thus, guarantees of openness of export markets have become
central to many developing country trade strategies, even to the
extent that these are to be pursued through an opening on the
import side.
See also Hamilton and Whalley (1988).
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All of these changes have been central in bringing
developing countries more centrally into the Uruguay Round
negotiations compared to the earlier Kennedy and Tokyo Round
negotiations. This, in turn, has moved developing countries part
way towards satisfying one of the central developed country
demands within the trading system; namely, their demand for
fuller participation by developing countries.50
The Ford Foundation-supported project report argues that the
developing countries have made two important steps since the
launch of the Uruguay Round in 1986: (1) extensive unilateral
liberalization as documented and discussed in this paper, and
(ii) more active participation in GATT negotiations through
proposals and participation in meetings in working groups. Their
argument is that if the developed countries have always wanted
fuller participation, they should now move to reinforce this by
offers which, in turn, will draw counter—offers on bindings and
liberalization from developing countries.
If this is the outcome, and even accelerates into the 1990s,
one could begin to initially see the higher income developing
countries in Asia, with perhaps one or two more countries in
Latin and Central America, coming into a system of international
disciplines which constrain their domestic policy actions, and
doing so because of the perceived benefits which they see in
participating in them. These could then be followed by a series
50 See the discussion in Whalley (ed.)(1989).
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of middle—income countries into the middle l990s, and eventually
a wider range of developing countries.
In the longer term, this would represent a scenario under
which the present liberalization solidifies its base and
accelerates. The difficulty with this is that both what happens
in the intermediate term, and what is done to consolidate these
liberalizations and prevent their reversal in the short run,
matter 5l
51 See also Laird and Nogues (1988) for discussion nf what
developed countries could do to help solidify these
liberalizations.
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VI SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING REMARKS
This paper is about recent trade and external sector
liberalization in the developing world. It argues that there are
major changes underway on the trade policy front in developing
countries. Asian liberalization represents a broadening and
acceleration of previous liberalization efforts. In Latin
America, domestic policy stability seems to be the key objective.
In Africa, there is major turnaround in policy with perhaps the
most striking changes of any region. These liberalizations are
being pursued unilaterally, and largely independently of the
trade negotiations taking place in the GATT Uruguay Round.
These recent liberalizations deserve attention because they
represent an important move towards the fuller participation in
the trading system that developed countries have been asking of
developing countries for many years, and these actions have been
taken unilaterally. At the end of the day, developed countries
have to ask what they can do to reinforce them. The paper
suggests that the form their future macro and trade policies take
and their multilateral response in the Uruguay Round will be
important determinants of their degree of permanence.
49
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Abreu, M. de Paiva and W. Fritsch (1987). 'Obstacles to
Brazilian Export Growth and the Coming MTNs". Paper
presented to working meeting of Ford Foundation Project in
London, Canada.
Africa Confidential. Vol. 29, No. 1, January 8, 1988.
Agarwal, M. (1989). 'The Role of the External Sector in India's
Development Strategy: Implications for MTN" in J. Whalley
(ed.) Developing Countries and the Global Trading System,
Volume 1. Macmillan Press Ltd. (forthcoming).
Balassa, 5. (1978). "Exports and Economic Growth Further
Evidence" Journal of Development Economics, Vol. 5,
pp. 181-189.
Balassa, B. and Associates (1982). Development Strategies in
Semi--Industrial Economies. Johns Hopkins University Press,
Baltimore.
Berlinski, J. and D. Schydlowsky (1982). "Argentina" in Balassa
and Associates (1982), Development Strategies in
Industrial Economies. Johns Hopkins University Press,
Baltimore, pp.83—122.
hagwati, J. (1978). Foreign Trade Regimes and Economic
Development: Anatomy and Consequences of Exchange Control
Regimes. Ballinger Publishing Company for the National
Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, Massachusetts.
Bhagwati, J. (1988). "Export—Promoting Trade Strategy: Issues
and Evidence". The World Bank Research Observer, Vol. 3,
No. 1, pp.27-57.
Bhagwati, J. and T. N. Srinivasan (1975). Foreign Trade Regimes
and Economic Development: India. National Bureau of
Economic Research, Columbia University Press, New York.
Bucay, N. and E. Perez Motta (1987). "Mexico" in J. Whalley
(ed.) Dealing With the North. Research Monograph, Centre
for the Study of International Economic Relations,
University of Western Ontario, London, Canada.
Sueno, G. M. and R. Villarreal (1988). "Trade Negotiations in a
Mexican Perspective." Paper presented at a Rockefeller
Foundation conference art "The Multilateral Trade
Negotiations and the Developing Countries", September 15—16,
Washington, D.C.
50
Corbo and 3. de Melo (1987). "Lessons from the Southern Cone
Policy Reforms". World Bank Research Observer, Vol. 2, No.
2, pp.111—142.
Diaz-Alejandro, C. (1975). "Trade Policies and Economic
Development" in P. Kenen (ed.) International Trade and
Finance. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge and New
York.
Dornbusch, R. (1986). "The Effects of OECD Macroeconomic
Policies on Non—Oil Developing Countries. A Review'. World
Bank, Washington, D.C.
Economist Intelligence Unit (1987). Taiwan Country Report #4,
p.14.
Economist Intelligence Unit (1988a). Argentina Country Profile
1988-89, London, p.10.
Economist Intelligence Unit (1988b). Chile Country Profile 1987-
88.
Edwards, S. (1984). "The Order of Liberalization of the Balance
of Payments. Should be Current Account be Opened up First?"
World Bank, Washington, D.C.
Financial Times. August 23, 1988, p.4.
GATT (1988a). International Trade 87—88, Vol. 1. Geneva.
GATT (1988b). Review of Developments in the Trading System.
Oct. 1987 — March 1988. Doc. L/6366, Geneva, p.123.
Greenaway, D. and C. Mimer (1989). "Industrial Incentives,
Domestic Resource Costs and Resource Allocation in
Madagascar". Applied Economics, forthcoming.
Guo, C. D. (1987). "China" in 3. Whalley (ed.) Dealing With the
North. Research Monograph, Centre for the Study of
International Economic Relations, University of Western
Ontario, London, Canada.
Hamilton, C. and 3. Whalley (1988). "Coalitions in the Uruguay
Round". Working Paper No. 2751, National Bureau of Economic
Research, Cambridge, Massachusetts.
Harvey, C. (1988). "Non-Marginal Price Changes, Conditions for
the Success of Floating Exchange Rate Systems in Sub-Saharan
Africa". 105 Bulletin, Vol. 19, No. 1, pp.67—74.
51
Helleiner, G. K. (ed.) (1986). Africa and the International
Monetary Fund. International Monetary Fund, Washington,
D.C.
Ikiara, G. (1987). "Kenya" in J. Whalley (ed.) Dealing With the
North. Research Monograph, Centre for the Study of
International Economic Relations, University of Western
Ontario, London, Canada.
international Monetary Fund (1987). Exchange Restrictions and
Exchange Arrangements. Annual Report. Washington, D.C.
International Monetary Fund (1988a). IMF Survey. June 27, 1988.
International Monetary Fund (1988b). Issues and Developments in
International Trade Policy. Occasional Paper 63,
International Monetary Fund, Washington, D.C.
Johnson, i. G. (1967). Economic Policies Towards Less Developing
Countries. The Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C.
Kravis, I. B., A. Hesten and H. Summers (1982). World Product
and Income: International Comparisons of Real Gross
Product. Johns Hopkins University Press for the World Bank,
Washington, D.C.
Krueger, A. 0. (1978). Foreign Trade Regimes and Economic
Development: Liberalization Attempts and Consequences.
Ballinger Publishing Co. for the National Bureau of Economic
Research, Cambridge, Massachusetts.
Laird, S. and J. Nogues (1988). "Trade Policies and the Debt
Crisis". Unpublished, World Bank, Washington, D.C.
Lee, C. and S. Naya (1988). "Trade in East Asian Development
with Comparative Reference to Southeast Asian Experiences'.
Economic Development and Cultural Change, Vol. 36, No. 3,
pp.123—152.
Leith, J. C. (1974). Foreign Trade Regimes and Economic
Development: Ghana. Columbia University Press for the
National Bureau of Economic Research, New York.
Lipumba, N. (1987). "Tanzania" in J. Whalley (ed.) Dealing With
the North. Research Monograph, Centre for the Study of
International Economic Relations, University of Western
Ontario, London, Canada.
52
Lipumba, N. (1989). "Domestic Supply Constraints versus Market
Access: International Trade and Economic Development in
Tanzania" in J. Whalley (ed.) Developing Countries and the
Global Trading System, Volume 2. Macmillan Press Ltd.
(forthcoming).
Little, I., T. Scitovsky and M. Scott (1970). Industry and Trade
in Some Developing Countries. A Comparative Study. Oxford
University Press, London, U.K.
Luedde-Neurath, R. (1986). Import Controls and Export—Oriented
Development: A Reassessment of the S. Korean Case.
Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado.
Manor, J. (1987). 'Tried, Then Abandoned: Economic
Liberalization in India". IDS Bulletin, Vol. 18, No. 4,
pp.39—44.
Mawakani, 5. (1986). "Fund Conditionality and the Socioeconomic
Situation in Africa" in G. K. Helleiner (ed.) Africa and the
International Monetary Fund. international Monetary Fund,
Washington, D.C., pp.107-109.
OECD (1988). OECD Economic Outlook. December, Paris, p.166.
Oyejide, T. A. (1987). "Nigeria" in J. Whalley (ed.) Dealing
With the North. Research Monograph, Centre for the Study of
International conomic Relations, University of Western
Ontar.o, London, Canada.
People's Daily. February 22, 1989, Beijing, China.
Philippine Tariff Commission (1988). Internal document.
?rebisch, R. (1964). "Towards a New Trade Policy for
Development". Proceedings of the United Nations Conference
on Trade and Development. Geneva, March 23-June 16, Vol. 2.
Preusse, H. G. (1988). "The Indirect Approach to Trade
Liberalization: Dynamic Consideration on Liberalization-
Cuin—Stabilization Policies in Latin America" in World
Development, Vol. 16, No. 8, pp.883—897.
Sampson, G. (1986). "Structural Change: Accommodating Imports
from Developing Countries". Paper presented at
International Economics Study Group Conference on Causes of
Changes and the Structure of International Trade. Isle of
Thorns, Sussex, U.K.
Shams, R. (1988). 'Adjustment Policy and Interest Groups in
Developing Countries". INTERECONOMICS, March/April, Vol.
23, pp.91—94.
53
UNCTAD (1988). "Protectionism and Structural Adjustment'.
TD/B/1196. Geneva.
United Nations (1985). Economic Bulletin for Asia and the
Pacific, Vol. XXXV, No. 2, December 1984. U.N., New York.
Westphal, L. E. and K. S. Kim (1982). "Korea" in Balassa and
Associates Development Strategies in Semi—Industrial
Economics. Johns Hopkins University Press, pp.212-279.
Whalley, J. (ed.) (1989). The Uruguay Round and Beyond. The
Final Report from the Ford Foundation Supported Project on
Developing Countries and the Global Trading System.
Macmillan Press Ltd. (forthcoming).
Williamson, J. (1982). The Lending Policies of the international
Monetary Fund. Institute for International Economics,
Washington, D.C.
Williamson, J. (1983). IMF Conditionality. Institute for
International Economics, Washington, D.C.
Wolf, M. (1986). 'Timing and Sequencing of Trade Liberalization
in Developing Countries". Asian Development Review, Vol. 4,
No. 2, pp.1—24.
World Bank (1983). "Brazil Industrial Policies and Manufactured
Exports". Washington, D.C.
World Bank (1987). World Development Report 1987, Washington,
D.C.
World Bank (1989). Adjustment Lending. An Evaluation of Ten
Years of Experience. Washington, D.C.
Young, S. (1987). "Korea" in J. Whalley (ed.) Dealing With the
North. Research Monograph, Centre for the Study of
International Economic Relations, University of Western
Ontario, London, Canada.
Young, S. (1988). "The Republic of Korea and the Uruguay Round
of Multilateral Trade Negotiations'. Paper presented for
the Rockefeller Foundation conference on the MTN and the
Developing Countries held September 15—16, Washington, D.C.
